As reported in media, the Centre told the Supreme Court that the CBI's suggestion to make the agency "truly autonomous" appeared to be an attempt to create "an all powerful" CBI director, which is not provided for in the Constitution and "would always carry the risk of potential misuse".
It said, "Authority without accountability will be draconian, more so when we are dealing with an organisation (the CBI) with police powers of arrest, seizure, raids and confinement. The government works on a system of checks and balances and builds adequate safeguards so that scope of misuse and arbitrary action is minimised,".
The rule equally applies to all and universal like on all the state or central ministers, MLA's, MP's bureaucratic secretaries and officers, even to all heads and officers of all those regulators like SEBI, CAG, LOKAYUKTS, RAW or IBs etc... The question how it is different in case of CBI as a whole of an institution and why the government whimsically and astonishingly treating "to make the agency "truly autonomous" appeared to be an attempt to create "an all powerful" CBI director which is not provided for in the Constitution and "would always carry the risk of potential misuse".? How come a director heading the CBI wing will simply become risky unless the vast number of subordinate staff not supporting him in his malafide actions ?
Yes checks and guards have to be employed, nobody denying this but the question is why this crucial button of check and control remains in the hands of politically installed leaders ? Can anyone guarantee that they (the political leadership) themselves will not become biased and draconian ?
When hundreds of such allegations are regularly made by the same set of people elected political leaders like MLA's, MP's ?, yes at that moment they are in opposition benches, but how one can say that those dully elected representative are not responsible and accountable, but the Home Minster controlling the CBI is ?
Is it not a glaring fact that the same CBI is entrusted to investigate at least Seven minister and various ministries and various political leaders of ruling parties ? Yes ironically it is true that the CBI's governing Home Ministry was of course not needed to be investigated.
If someone suggest that why so, the answer is you are foolish in asking such question, how a SP of Police find fault and investigate the IG of Police ? Yes here remains the anomaly the Supreme Court wanted to rectify, when it wanted to make this highest investigating institution independent and powerful free from the clutches of powerful but rampantly corrupt and unashamed, but so called people's elected political leadership.
When hundreds of such allegations are regularly made by the same set of people elected political leaders like MLA's, MP's ?, yes at that moment they are in opposition benches, but how one can say that those dully elected representative are not responsible and accountable, but the Home Minster controlling the CBI is ?
Is it not a glaring fact that the same CBI is entrusted to investigate at least Seven minister and various ministries and various political leaders of ruling parties ? Yes ironically it is true that the CBI's governing Home Ministry was of course not needed to be investigated.
If someone suggest that why so, the answer is you are foolish in asking such question, how a SP of Police find fault and investigate the IG of Police ? Yes here remains the anomaly the Supreme Court wanted to rectify, when it wanted to make this highest investigating institution independent and powerful free from the clutches of powerful but rampantly corrupt and unashamed, but so called people's elected political leadership.
During coal scam hearing in the court the CBI was called almost a "caged parrot" and vowed to make it independent of political interference, and to that court advice the CBI submitted that it could not remain insulated from political interference as long as it was dependent on government funds and lacked complete autonomy in running its internal affairs and wanted a stable and fixed tenure of three years.
But the department of personnel objected in its affidavit, "An all powerful director CBI without adequate checks and balances would not be consonant with settled constitutional principles and would carry the risk of potential misuse and may not be conducive to fearless and independent functioning of the organisation at all levels."
But the department of personnel objected in its affidavit, "An all powerful director CBI without adequate checks and balances would not be consonant with settled constitutional principles and would carry the risk of potential misuse and may not be conducive to fearless and independent functioning of the organisation at all levels."
Also rejecting the CBI's proposal for an internal vigilance mechanism instead of the accountability commission, the Centre said the chief vigilance officer, who is an employee of the agency, could seldom question the CBI director for potential acts of commission or omission.And added, "The fact that the CBI is outside the purview of the Right to Information Act (except administrative matters) is also relevant in this regard,".
But where it solves the basic question that how the CBI becomes effective and independent, when it has to investigate the Government machinary time and again in the major national interest ? Does it serves the purpose of effective security of national interest without the crucial autonomy to do so?